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The seal hunt has captured an inordinate amount of public attention 
over the last few decades compared with other prevalent means of 
animal exploitation. Thus, it is a wonder that a book like this new es-
sential legal anthropological work by Sellheim has not come before. 
Sellheim sets out to present the ‘human dimension of the seal hunt’ 
(at ix). He succeeds in doing so. The first part of the book sets out 
the sociocultural value of seals and the legal regimes that govern 
them. It is here, at the book’s heart, that Sellheim’s anthropocen-
tric narrative works best. The latter part of the book explores the 
European Union’s (EU) seal regime, critiquing it from multiple angles. 
This is fascinating, particularly where he provides insight into the 
EU’s travaux préparatoires. However, Sellheim’s persuasiveness here 
is harmed by his neglect of popular counterarguments and his light-
handed approach to the rich animal welfare literature available on 
this topic.
Sellheim is self-aware of the uphill battle his book faces. He pres-
ents the human side of a debate which has seen animal advocates, 
conservationists and sympathetic policymakers come out strongly 
in favour of protecting seals. However, Chapters 2 and 3 do well to 
present reasons one might want to defend the seal hunt. He shares 
the sociocultural significance of the hunt and the – in places – ex-
tensive regulation to which the hunts are subject. This works to add 
gravitas to Sellheim’s later arguments about the EU’s seal regime. 
The regime, which bans the placing on the market of seal products in 
the EU (with exceptions for marine management hunts, indigenous 
hunts and travellers’ personal possessions), is more easily portrayed 
as flawed if it is introduced in the context of a socioculturally import-
ant hunt that is responsibly regulated.
In Chapter 2, Sellheim provides a reflection on mythology (in-
cluding stories of Selkies and indigenous myths and legends), tradi-
tional practice and evolving commercialization of the seal hunt. He 
also describes the way the hunt adapts through periods of geologi-
cal change, war and market fluctuation as well as how it has shaped 
political, cultural and cosmological identities of peoples. His exam-
ination is broad, spanning hunts across the Northern and Southern 
hemispheres. This is valuable context to this complex and conten-
tious sociolegal issue. Sellheim also usefully nuances the dichoto-
mization between commercial hunts (typified as brutal clubbing of 
baby seals) and Inuit subsistence hunts (typified as respectful and 
culturally significant use of a totemic species). For example, he notes 
that the controversial commercial Canadian hunt is not carried out 
by large firms or companies anymore but, instead, is conducted by 
individual fishermen with small vessels. He notes that the seal is 
culturally significant beyond indigenous communities and that small 
operators like this equally depend on ‘marine resources’ for their 
livelihood.
In Chapter 3, Sellheim provides a historic insight into domestic, 
regional and international legal regimes that have governed or now 
govern the seal hunt in order to ‘manage dwindling stocks and to 
ensure the continuance of a thriving industry’ (at 111). A particularly 
useful section explores the applicability of international treaties to 
seals (dating back to the Jan Mayen Seal Fishery Treaty of 1875 be-
tween Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Norway, Russia and 
Sweden) and the patchwork of international regulatory regimes that 
has developed since and impacts upon the seal hunt. Sellheim’s anal-
ysis of the international legal regimes that govern the seal hunt re-
veals a strong interest in sustainable sealing and conservation with 
very little interest in welfare at the international level. In parts of this 
chapter, Sellheim would have benefited from depth over breadth. 
For example, he discusses the listing of different seal species in an-
nexes to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species (CITES). However, he does not elaborate on enforcement 
under that regime or the impact of listing on the conservation status 
of seals. The welfare provisions in CITES suffer from particularly 
poor enforcement which means that listing in a CITES appendix does 
not guarantee impact in practice.1 This potential for an enforcement 
gap is also of concern regarding the treaty’s primary conservation 
objectives. Sellheim also provides a comprehensive overview of do-
mestic legislation regulating seal hunts in the seal hunting nations. 
This covers regulations regarding conservation (permits, closed sea-
sons, etc.) and welfare (stunning, checking and bleeding procedures, 
for example) as well as countries lacking regulation, such as Russia. 
He notes that only a minority of States continue to permit the ‘com-
mercial exploitation of seals’ (at 213). However, he expresses sur-
prise that most of the legislation does not deal with welfare or 
condition hunts on welfare requirements. He expected that because 
the public debate on sealing has centred on welfare, the legislation 
would tackle this issue. However, much of the legislation Sellheim 
covers predates the popular ethical debate about sealing. Thus, it 
seems to me that this absence is precisely why there has been de-
bate in the first place.
 1Cf. M Bowman, ‘Conflict or Compatibility: The Trade, Conservation and Animal Welfare 
Dimensions of CITES’ (1998) 1 Journal of International Wildlife Law and Policy 9, 18.
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Some cognitive dissonance rears its head at this point regarding 
the shallow treatment of animals in legislation and the weighty cul-
tural significance attributed to seals in Chapter 2, particularly by 
Inuit communities. Sellheim does not seek to deal with this disso-
nance because of his positioning set out at the beginning of the 
book. He admits that the book ‘hinges on the narrative of the seal as 
an exploitable resource’ (at 1). Sellheim does not justify this choice 
and the chosen narrative quickly begins to feel insufficient. This may 
go unnoticed by many. Indeed, it is common to regard animals as re-
sources and the legislation does so. We continue to be influenced by 
Aristotle’s Great Chain of Being in that way. But there exist rich ex-
panses of literature on the question of the seal (and animals more 
generally), its moral considerability and what might be owed to it. 
The choice not to address this literature in selecting a narrative 
means the book carries a pregnant silence that builds throughout. 
Indeed, this seems like a missed opportunity to have engaged with 
animal liberationists or others with knowledge of animal ethics. The 
term ‘animal liberationist’ could be said to stem from Peter Singer, 
though the movement has spread widely and encompasses a multi-
tude of ethical approaches to the question of the animal.2 There are 
important insights that animal liberationists might learn from 
Sellheim’s book, but I fear they will too quickly dismiss it for the ca-
sual way it selects its narrative. Sellheim’s desire to tell a story that 
appears marginalized is an honourable one. But it remains true that 
seals are a unique case: the sustained attention toward sealing and 
condemnation of the practice are rare deviances from the norm of 
public acquiescence or ignorance toward animal use and animal suf-
fering. To say that the human story has been neglected here reads 
like arguments about discrimination against white men or the need 
for straight pride festivals. It misses the bigger picture.
Besides the problem of audience capture, I fear that the latter 
part of the book, which is more argumentative, is not as convincing 
as it could be due to the absence of engagement with key pieces of 
literature. I will refer to four of Sellheim’s key arguments in this re-
gard after providing an overview of the book’s final two substantive 
chapters.
In Chapters 4 and 5, Sellheim explores the history and develop-
ment of the EU’s seal regime, including its path to enactment and 
the key legal challenges brought against the regime at the Court of 
Justice of the EU (CJEU) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
dispute settlement body. Sellheim points out the neglect of sealers 
livelihoods in the debates surrounding the ban. These debates paid 
no regard to moral positions that legitimize seal hunting or the jus-
tifications relied on by those taking part in the hunt. For these rea-
sons, he warns against moral imperialism. This point is well made. 
Calls from affected communities for more effective consultation 
and consideration should be taken seriously, particularly given the 
uneven nature of the EU’s legislation on animal welfare (focusing on 
some species more than others). It may be that emerging discourse 
on global animal law can contemplate how such meaningful dialogue 
can take place.
Sellheim also provides an enlightening insight into the inter-
action between international trade law and moral concern, har-
kening back to the 1815 Declaration Relative to the Universal 
Abolition of the Slave Trade. However, he seems to misrepresent 
the relationship between international trade law and animal wel-
fare in a few key ways. He argues that animal welfare is no justi-
fication for trade barriers due to the operation of likeness tests 
under WTO law and the treatment of processes and production 
methods (PPMs) therein. But it is quite clear from the relevant case 
law and literature, especially the EC–Asbestos case, that likeness 
is an individual determination in each case that can encompass 
consumers’ tastes and habits (which could most certainly include 
animal welfare).
This comment leads back to the four key arguments made by 
Sellheim that could have been strengthened by engagement with 
literature that reaches different conclusions. First, he criticizes the 
EU seal regime because sealers would ‘accuse opponents [of the 
hunt] of inconsistency for opposing sealing but eating other ani-
mals’ (at 267). On this point, many animal liberationists would ac-
tually agree with Sellheim. Indeed, Francione highlights the 
problem of our ‘moral schizophrenia’ towards animals whereby we 
care for some animals, hate others and eat billions.3 Sellheim does 
not forward an argument as to why this inconsistency makes op-
position to the seal hunt illegitimate. Elsewhere, he argues that the 
EU favours a utilitarian approach to animals so that their protec-
tion is weighed against human interests. If these points had been 
drawn together, they could have supported one another. Also, 
there is fascinating discussion on moral consistency in legislation 
by Howse, Langille and Sykes.4 The authors make a convincing ar-
gument that counters Sellheim’s point, stating that such inconsis-
tency is acceptable and even to be expected.
Second, Sellheim argues that the EU seal regime’s exception for 
indigenous hunts is ineffective and ill-conceived. He notes that the 
EU failed to heed the inputs of Inuit communities in their public con-
sultation contributions on the seal regime. This is undoubtedly a fail-
ure. He argues that the seal regime is ill-conceived because the Inuit 
exception harms the animal welfare intentions of the ban and the 
exception is ineffective anyway because of the ‘interrelationships 
between the market and subsistence economies’ (at 259). However, 
Sellheim does not deal with the EU response to the outcome of 
the WTO EC–Seal Products case. Sellheim’s argument echoes the 
argument made against the EU in the case, which caused the EU 
to respond by limiting the exception for Inuit communities. This is 
an interesting demonstration of the EU’s priorities that would have 
benefited from discussion here.
 2See, e.g., P Singer, Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals 
(HarperCollins 1975).
 3G Francione, Animals as Persons (Columbia University Press 2008) 150.
 4R Howse, J Langille and K Sykes, ‘Pluralism in Practice: Moral Legislation and the Law of 
the WTO After Seal Products’ (2015) 48 George Washington International Law Review 
81, 114–115.
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Another point is that Sellheim argues that the different approach 
to Inuit hunts by the EU ‘cannot be justified with anything other than 
an emotional and nonfactual approach towards seal hunting’ (at 
260). This dichotomizes emotion and rationality in a rather outdated 
way. It has been convincingly argued in many places that empathy is 
a ‘complex intellectual as well as emotional exercise’ and an ‘imagina-
tive exercise that requires judgement and evaluation’.5 This also 
overlooks the seriousness of intersecting oppressions which may go 
some of the way to explaining the combination of these two objec-
tives in the seal regime.6 It is increasingly recognized that oppressive, 
paternal forces work to marginalize a number of communities in in-
tersecting ways. Viewed through this lens, the EU’s approach to Inuit 
hunts could be argued to be more than merely ‘emotional and 
nonfactual’.
Third, Sellheim argues that while the seal regime holds animal 
welfare as a principle concern, the travaux préparatoires suggest the 
EU was going to adopt a ban irrespective of animal welfare concerns. 
Indeed, he expertly demonstrates the shifting focus in the lead up to 
the enactment of the final seal regime. This shifts from a focus on 
conservation surrounding the Seal Pups Directive of 1983; to stud-
ies that recommended labelling so as to avoid the potential impact 
of a ban on Inuit communities; to an eventual decision to enact a ban 
and a shift toward non-utilization which Sellheim distinguishes from 
welfare (more on this below). He concludes that the drafting process 
reveals a lack of a ‘coherent, problem-solving oriented approach’ (at 
251). However, it seems to me that the shift in focus is not uncom-
mon in the deliberative process toward enacting legislation. Sellheim 
also critiques the fact that the EU shifts its focus when defending 
the EU seal regime against challenges raised at the CJEU and WTO 
dispute settlement body. The shifting focus goes from improving the 
functioning of the internal market to protecting public morality re-
lated to animal welfare. However, this is also common as a defensive 
tactic, especially where different forums and different legal ques-
tions are at issue. It would have been useful if Sellheim had spent 
more time unpicking what was problematic about the shifts in focus 
in a legal sense.
Finally, Sellheim argues that bans are ineffective at protecting 
welfare and only regulation can do that. He argues that while the EU 
seal regime ‘has undoubtedly contributed to a reduction in the num-
ber of seals that are killed, it does little to impact the welfare of the 
individual seal which is still killed’ (at 256). Sellheim is right to say that 
regulation more directly impacts welfare than a ban. But he seems 
to neglect the fact that it is not the EU’s place to regulate the indus-
try in Canada or elsewhere. It cannot legislate extraterritorially in 
this way. Perhaps it could have defended such conditionality within 
a trade restriction before the WTO. It would have been interesting 
to hear Sellheim’s thoughts on how such a measure could have been 
drafted and defended.
Sellheim’s argument that a ban fails to protect public moral con-
cern for seals contains some indeterminacy stemming from the defi-
nitions of welfare, conservation and protection. He distinguishes 
well between welfare and conservation throughout his book but 
never pauses to define these three terms. This causes some difficul-
ties. For example, Sellheim argues that ‘animal welfare is a relative 
concept that primarily refers to animals held in captivity and which 
does not equate with an absence of killing’ (at 256). Animal welfare 
does not primarily refer to animals held in captivity, as wide-scoping 
work on wild animal welfare will attest.7 It is true that welfare does 
not equate with an absence of killing. Nevertheless, whether an ab-
sence of killing is desirable depends on the underlying ethic behind 
welfare-protective measures. Many animal rights views do pursue 
non-utilization, and welfarist law can be backed by rights-based 
rather than utilitarian ethics. I think it would have been useful to 
dwell on what these terms mean and to engage with Sykes’ argument 
that ‘protection’ refers to something broader in scope. She defines 
animal protection as encompassing ‘elements of conservation-fo-
cused concerns, welfare concerns, and something that does not quite 
fit into either category: the value of the life of a charismatic individual 
animal’.8 Sykes is writing about the EC–Seal Products dispute and I 
believe that her exploration of protection is essential to understand-
ing and critiquing the EU’s policy goals regarding the seal regime.
To conclude, Sellheim’s book provides incredibly valuable insight 
into the socio-economic realities of the seal hunt. This is also the 
first place in which lawyers can find a comprehensive overview of 
the relevant legal regimes applicable to seal hunts across the globe. 
For these reasons, this book is bound to become essential reading 
and Sellheim ought to be commended for the rigorous work that has 
gone into this. I understand why Sellheim made the narrative choice 
to treat seals as exploitable resources. However, I think that this nar-
rative choice ought to have been better justified by reference to the 
literature. I also think that, even having made this choice, there were 
insights provided by animal liberationists and others working on the 
sealing issue that would have added nuance and precision to the final 
chapters of the book. The academic work stemming from the animal 
liberation movement frequently displays intellectual rigor and it de-
serves attention in this debate. It is much more than a mere attempt 
to reach a ‘moral high ground’ (at 284). In any event, this book is 
a great accomplishment and is bound to inspire further fascinating 
debate and research on the seal hunt.
Iyan Offor
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 5See, e.g., J Donovan, ‘Attention to Suffering: Sympathy as a Basis for Ethical Treatment 
of Animals’ in J Donovan and CJ Adams (eds), The Feminist Care Tradition in Animal Ethics 
(Columbia University Press 2007) 174, 176 and 223.
 6See, e.g., M Deckha, ‘Toward a Postcolonial, Posthumanist Feminist Theory: 
Centralizing Race and Culture in Feminist Work on Nonhuman Animals’ (2012) 27 
Hypatia 527.
 7See, e.g., W Scholtz, Animal Welfare and International Environmental Law: From 
Conservation to Compassion (Edward Elgar 2019).
 8K Sykes, ‘Globalization and the Animal Turn: How International Trade Law Contributes 
to Global Norms of Animal Protection’ (2016) 5 Transnational Environmental Law 55, 67.
